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I. INTRODUCTION
As Syria enters its ninth year of civil war, the numbers only
continue to rise. Deaths have reached 370,000 and counting.1 More
than 6.2 million individuals have been internally displaced. Over 5.6
million individuals have registered as refugees. Loss in cumulative
GDP has topped 226 billion dollars.2 But as the numbers remain
staggeringly high, dominating international attention, there has been a
shift in the power balance of the war—a shift back towards the
previous status quo with the Assad regime holding a firm clasp on
territorial power.3 And with the announcement from President Trump
to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, the Assad regime watches one
more player trickle off the battlefield as they close in on the last
remaining rebel enclave in Idlib.4 An end, thus, looms in sight with
President Assad in power and the regime still standing. While the
precise date of this end remains precarious, it is critical to begin
examining the options available to Syria post armed conflict to
transition the country away from violence, and any cycles of violence,
into sustainable peace.
The most widely recognized, highly funded paradigm of
transitional justice is retributive justice, taking on the form of
1
Eight years after the war began, more than 370,000 individuals have been killed,
including
112,000
civilians.,
FRANCE24
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.france24.com/en/20190315-syria-death-toll-tops-370000-8-yearswar-monitor.
2
The World Bank In Syrian Arab Republic, Overview, THE WORLD BANK (Oct.
11, 2018), www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview.
3
See Liz Sly, Syria’s War Could Be Entering Its Last and Most Dangerous Phase,
THE WASH. POST, (Aug. 10, 2018,), www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-warcould-be-entering-its-last-and-most-dangerous-phase/2018/08/09/e9e60442-8f6011e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html?utm_term=.0bc52680dba0.
4
See Missy Ryan and Josh Dawsey, U.S. Troops to Be Pulled out of Syria Quickly,
White
House
Says,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
19,
2018,),
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-plansto-pull-us-troops-from-syria-immediately-defense-officialsays/2018/12/19/4fcf188e-0397-11e9-b5df5d3874f1ac36_story.html?utm_term=.e9c6a69b7c19.
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international criminal tribunals (“ICTs”). Following World War II and
the infamous Nuremberg Trials, contemporary schemes of justice have
been molded into ICTs as vehicles to settle disputes and to try the most
serious of human rights violations.5 Impunity was the target;
international jurisprudence was the tool. But as ICTs have increased in
frequency consecutively with on-going human rights abuses, the
discourse on the efficacy of such retributive mechanisms has grown.6
Concerns center on whether the goals of justice have been achieved,
whether international showcases of punishment effectively deter
future abuses, and whether the high costs of such institutions are offset
by the benefits gained. With Syria’s civil war approaching a new phase
of its life, finding the answers to these concerns re-emerges as a goal
more critical than ever to accomplish.
Through a brief examination of the history of ICTs, we
attempt to address these concerns and apply them to Syria. First, we
look at what types of issues an international tribunal would be handling
by examining what types of crimes have been perpetrated in Syria.
Next, we evaluate whether international criminal prosecution exists as
an available option in Syria’s near future. Then we examine, if
prosecution does present itself plausible, what the cost-benefit scale
would look like for a Syrian tribunal based on past and present ICTs.
Looking at a variety of factors from cost to legitimacy to political
challenges, this holistic lens drives us to a conclusion that not only is
international criminal prosecution an improbable option in Syria’s near
future, but that even if it were plausible, the benefits reaped would
serve neither local Syrian interests nor international goals. Last, we
offer a different picture of Syria’s future, shaped by reconstruction,
reparations, and reconciliation rather than retribution to pave the way
for a balance of peace with accountability.

5
See Ad Hoc Tribunals International, INT’L COMMITTEE of the RED CROSS 1
(Feb. 9, 2017,), www.icrc.org/en/document/ad-hoc-tribunals.
6
See generally Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, Do international criminal tribunals deter
or exacerbate humanitarian atrocities?, 84 WASH. ULU. L. REV. 779 (2006); See also David
Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 INT’L L. 861 (2006).; See also Mirjan
Damaska, What is the point of international criminal justice?, 83 CHI.-.–KENT L. REV. 329
(2008).
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II. THE CRIMES
Assessing the plausibility of a war crimes tribunal necessitates
understanding the extent to which the court is to prosecute individual
crimes. Given the scale, the extremity, and the arduous disposition of
such a war, understanding the crimes committed by all parties to the
war proves to be a daunting, if not quite near insurmountable task. The
mere quantity of armed groups involved on the ground in Syria
complicates such a task, with each major party to the war, the Baathist
Party, rebel forces, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Kurds, and ISIL being
partitioned into smaller bands each responsible for asserting their own
agendas.7 Moreover, the war is still ongoing and first hand access to
the country to investigate alleged crimes remains near impossible. This
has left the global community without fundamental resources to fully
comprehend to what extent crimes are taking place and, more
importantly, by whom. While the issue of evidence procurement and
reliability will be addressed later, it is critical to discern what types of
crimes a potential court would be facing if such an avenue for
transitional justice is to be pursued.
Two different mechanisms, both spawned by the United
Nations, have been established as an effort to document and preserve
evidence of international law violations and crimes within Syria. First
in 2011, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic (“the Commission”) was established by the UN
Human Rights Council “to investigate all alleged violations of
international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab
Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to
such violations . . . and, where possible, to identify those responsible.”8
In 2016, the UN General Assembly went even further by establishing
the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (“IIIM”),
with the specific mandate to “to collect, consolidate, preserve and
analyze evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and
7
Alia Chunghtai, Syria’s War: Who Controls What?, GCC News, AL JAZEERA,
Al
Jazeera,
(Mar.
13,
2019,
15:09
GMT),
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided150529144229467.html.
8
Report Rep. of the Human Rights Hum. Rts. Council on its 17th special
session, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S–17/2 (2011).
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human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to
facilitate and expedite . . . criminal proceedings.”9 The main difference
between the two mechanisms is that the Commission focuses on
investigating and publishing records of crimes, while the IIIM focuses
on collecting and preserving evidence of international law violations
and individual criminal liability for use in future prosecutions.
Furthermore, the IIIM is not required to publicly disclose the evidence
collected nor publish reports on its findings, highlighting its particular
attention to evidence preservation.10 Given the restricted status of
IIIM findings, reports by the Commission will be employed to paint a
better picture for the class of crimes and evidence that a future tribunal
would be evaluating.
A. Unlawful Killing
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits the killing of
persons taking no part in the hostilities outside of a judgement by a
regularly constituted court and the due process of law. 11 Under the
Rome Statute, murder of civilians is a crime against humanity under
Article 7 (1)(a), willful killing is a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(i),
intentionally attacking civilians is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i),
and killing or wounding an hors de combat fighter is a war crime under
Article 8(2)(b)(vi).12 The right to life is further protected under a
number of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”).13
Since the start of the war in 2011, there has been documented
evidence corroborated by eyewitnesses that implicates government
forces in the extrajudicial killings of civilians and hors de combats in
General Assembly G. A. Res.71/248, ¶ 4. (Dec. 21, 2016).
Theodor Meron, Closing the Accountability Gap: Concrete Steps Toward Ending
Impunity for Atrocity Crimes, 112.3 AM. J. INT’L L. 433, 443 (2018).
11
The Geneva Conventions common art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 63 U.S.T. 3114,
3217, 3316, 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions.].
12
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court common art. 7–8, July
17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
13
See G. A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. art. 3
(Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights part III, art. 6,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR.].
9

10
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violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.14 Starting in 2011,
eyewitnesses, including defectors, alleged government forces using
indiscriminate attacks to systematically quell protestors.15 In 2016,
reports were made of detainees perishing while in government custody,
often times following arbitrary detention.16 Furthermore, a 2016 UN
report asserts that the systematic deaths of prisoners in regimecontrolled detention centers constitutes crimes against humanity.17 A
2018 report documents pro-government militia members
indiscriminately attacking civilians and a site for internally displaced
people in northern Homs. The victims included both children and the
elderly.18
Akin to the regime forces, reports have documented extra
judicial killings by non- government forces including both foreign and
domestic armed factions. A 2013 report documented, “a captured
soldier or pro-government fighter who ‘confesses’ faces immediate
execution. . . . On 20 May, a captured soldier was executed in Qalat AlMadiq after confessing to killing a fighter for the Free Syrian Army
(“FSA”).”19 Furthermore, eyewitnesses have reported anti-government
forces killing civilians and hors de combat fighters.20 In one instance, antigovernment fighters executed pro-government Sunnis in villages
outside Dara’a city.21 In 2017, armed non-government forces carried
out numerous car explosions in Al-Rashidin, including one instance
which alone killed ninety-six evacuees, of which sixty-eight were
14
See generally Independent International Commission Indep. Int’l Comm’n
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Reports 2011-2018.
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Documentation.a
spx.
15
UN Human Rights U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the independent
international commission Indep. International Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S–17/2/Add.1, ¶ 41(2011) [hereinafter: The
Commission.].
16
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/55., ¶ 11 (2016).
17
UN Human U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in
Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1; hereinafter ¶ 97
(Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Out of Sight, Out of Mind.].
18
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/65., ¶ 32–5 (2018).
19
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/46., ¶ 49 (2013).
20
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59., ¶ 64 (2013).
21
Id. ¶ 62.

6

2020

The Price of Prosecution

8:1

children. 22 That same year, residents of Aqarib al-Safiyah fell victim to
ISIL-lead snipers during the night. The Commission reported that
“among the victims were a four-month-old baby and an eleven-yearold boy. In total, fifty-two civilians were killed, including seven women
and twelve children.”23 In 2013, Jabhat Al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate,
was found to command several makeshift courts, whose procedures
resulted in summary execution without due process.24 One video
shows Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters executing twelve pro-government
soldiers with gunshots to their heads.25
B. Arbitrary Arrests and Detention
Article 9 of the ICCPR forbids arbitrary arrest or detention:
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”26 Persons who are
arrested are to be told of the reasons for their arrest pursuant to
established law.27 If a person is arrested on a criminal charge, they are
to be brought before a judge or authorized official who is empowered
by law to exercise judicial authority. 28 Furthermore, Article 55 (1)(c)
of the Rome Statute prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention.29
In 2013, the Commission interviewed approximately fifty
interviewees who reported arbitrary arrest by both government and
anti-government forces.30 Most of those arrested were male, some of
these arrestees were even children.31 Reports indicate that during
government led raids in neighborhoods, those suspected of partaking
in opposition or rebel activities were sent to one of the varying
government-controlled detention centers. There, the prisoners were
often tortured to procure information that would expose others
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/55., ¶ 40 (2017).
Id. ¶ 45.
See Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 71.
Id. ¶ 72.
ICCPR, supra note 13, at art. 9.
Id.
Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 12, at art. 55.
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59, supra note 20 at Annex VI.

, ¶ 1.
31

Id. ¶ 2.
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possibly involved in oppositional activities to create a list of future
arrestees.32 Those arrested were held indefinitely without access to legal
counsel. Often, those detained were only released in exchange for
ransom or bribes.33 In one instance, a man from Dara’a was detained
for six months before being released following a payment of 300,000
Lira (3,000 USD) to government officials.34 A 2016 Commission report
titled, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian
Arab Republic,” estimates that tens of thousands of people have been
detained by the Syrian government, while thousands have disappeared
after initial arrest by state forces or while moving through government
held territory.35 Most of the deaths taking place in detention centers
were reported to be in detentions centers controlled by regime
intelligence services, the mukhabarat.36 Furthermore, the extent to
which these enforced disappearances have been taking place by
government forces has been characterized by the Commission as “a
widespread and systemic attack against the civilian population.”37
Similarly, early scenes of the civil war saw anti-government
armed groups taking members of the regime’s coalition hostage. Some
were taken for ransom or exchange; others were taken for intelligence
and recruitment purposes.38 One witness explained, “After the army
has come and gone, the FSA come back and do the same. They also
arrest and detain people. . . . We don’t know what happened to them.
They’d take them away and we’d never see them again.”39 Antigovernment groups often created their own makeshift detention
centers, where detainees, including both civilians and government
soldiers, were held, tortured, and killed, some by means of execution
and others by means of lack of medication and extensive injury. 40 It is
critical to note that the dynamic and inconsistent nature of these anti-

32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 12.
Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 19.
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59, supra note 20, at Annex VI,

¶ 15–9.
39
40

Id. ¶ 17.
Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 67 –9.
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government armed forces, including dissolution, reformation, and
evolution of new groups, has limited the Commission’s ability to track
the violations by these groups. 41
C. Torture and Ill-Treatment
Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are
prohibited under Article 7 of the ICCPR.42 Additionally, the UN
General Assembly ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1984, to
which Syria is a signatory.43 It should be noted, however, that under
this convention only public officials or persons acting in official
capacity are encompassed within the definition of torture; thus, torture
by anti-government forces or non-state actors would be excluded from
this scope of liability. Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva
Conventions forbids “violence to life and persons, in particular . . .
cruel treatment and torture.”44 The Rome Stature categorizes torture
or inhuman treatment as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(a)
and a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(ii).45
The Commission conducted interviews in 2012 with
individuals who had either been tortured at a detention center or
endured torture at an unofficial facility by government officials and
officers.46 Torture was consistently described among the interviewees
who discussed “being severely beaten about the head and body with
electric cables, whips, metal and wooden sticks and rifle butts, burned
with cigarettes, kicked, or subjected to electric shocks applied to
sensitive parts of the body, including the genitals.” 47 Some other
torture tactics included hanging detainees to walls or ceilings by their
wrists, tying detainees to boards while they were either stretched or

Id. ¶ 66.
ICCPR, supra note 13, ¶7.
43
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
44
Geneva Conventions, supra note 11, at art. 3.
45
Rome Statute, supra note 12, at art. 7.
46
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50., ¶ 74–7 (2012).
47
Id. ¶ 77.
41
42
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folded in half, and engaging in sexual violence.48 Degrading treatment
has included forcibly shaving the detainees, forcing detainees to imitate
animals, forcibly undressing detainees who would remain nude for an
extended periods of time, and threatening both assault and execution
on the detainees themselves as well as their relatives. 49 Detainees
reported lack of food, water, medication, and sanitary facilities at
detention centers.50 One detainee reported drinking his own urine after
going a week without water.51 Another report documents that a
fourteen-year-old boy detained following demonstrations received
electric shocks and beatings during an interrogation by Military
Intelligence.52
Starting in 2012, the Commission documented reports of
torture and ill-treatment, including infliction of severe pain,
punishment and humiliation by armed groups against members of
government forces.53 Captured government fighters reported that they
were beaten with electric wire and had their heads forcibly pushed in
and out of water in a threat of drowning.54 Video footages depicts
Syrian security forces and regime supporters confessing under torture;
the detainees displayed signs of physical abuse including bruising,
bleeding, and broken bones.55 Civilians suspected of government
affiliation have been subjected to torture by anti-government armed
groups; some have died because of the extent of their injuries. 56 In
August of 2013, armed groups detained and tortured civilians for their
religion; in July of 2013, Kurds were beaten and electrocuted by
Islamist terrorist factions.57 At checkpoints in Ar Raqqah and AlHasakah, armed groups (including Jabhat-al-Nusra, Ahrar Al-Sham,
Shahic Walid Al-Sukhni Battalion) would routinely beat, humiliate, and
expose civilians to harsh treatment, including severe physical and

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. ¶ 78.
Id. ¶ 79.
Id. ¶ 81.
Id.
Id. at Annex VIII, ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 68.
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65., ¶ 58 (2014).
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mental suffering.58 The Commission determined that the level of
torture and inhuman treatment by nonstate armed groups constitutes
widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population.59
D. Rape and Sexual Violence
Rape and sexual violence are defined as crimes against
humanity under Article 7(1)(g) and war crimes under Article
8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute.60 The Geneva Conventions do not
list rape and sexual violence as prohibited acts; however, under
common Article 3, violence to life and person, cruel treatment, torture,
and outrages upon personal dignity are all prohibited. 61 Additionally,
Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute lists rape, sexual slavery, and any
other form of sexual violence as violations of common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions.62 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts adds rape, enforced prostitution, and
any indecent assault to the list of prohibited acts against civilians. 63
Furthermore, the realm of liability for rape and sexual violence has
increasingly expanded through ad hoc tribunals, including the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). The
ICTY and ICTR have both proscribed acts of sexual violence among
indictments for genocide, torture, inhumane acts, and crimes against
humanity.64

Id. ¶ 58–9.
Id. ¶ 60.
60
Rome Statute, supra note 12, at arts. 7–8.
61
Geneva Conventions, supra note 11, at art. 3.
62
Rome Statute, supra note 12, at art. 8.
63
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 4(2), June 8, 1977., 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
64
See, e.g., Crimes of Sexual Violence: Landmark Cases.” United Nations:
International, U. N.: INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
https://www.icty.org/en/features/crimes-sexual-violence/landmark-cases.;
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T;, Judgment (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v.
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T,
Judgement (Dec. 3, 2003.).
58
59
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Collecting evidence for rape and sexual violence has proven to
be one of the hardest tasks in the pursuit of the truth. Cultural, social,
and religious institutions surrounding sexuality within Syria have
created roadblocks in procuring eyewitness and victim testimonies of
the extent to which these crimes have taken place. 65 Nonetheless,
evidence of rape and sexual violence does exist, though it may
underestimate the frequency to which these crimes take place.
Reports demonstrate that government forces overwhelmingly
used rape and sexual violence during house searches, at checkpoints,
and in both official and unofficial detention centers.66 Government
forces and Shabiha, pro-government militias, used house raids to arrest
males suspected of partaking in opposition activities; there, women
were subjected to rapes and often gang-rapes by up to six perpetrators
while their families, husbands, and children were forced to watch.67 In
2012, reports indicate that women were also abducted, raped, and
forced to walk naked in the streets of Homs.68 Accounts further
demonstrate that rape and sexual violence were used as part of torture
and coercive tactics in detention centers as a means to procure
information and force surrender.69 Numerous accounts depict males
receiving electric shocks and burning by cigarettes or lighters to their
genitals, genital mutilation, and rape using objects including batons,
wooden sticks, pipes, and bottles.70 Children as young as nine years old
also fell victim to rape and sexual violence.71 The Commission
determined that Government forces used rape and sexual violence as
part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians. 72
The infrequent use of checkpoints by armed groups and the
decreased movement of persons from Government territory into
territory controlled by armed groups reduced the exposure of women
The Commission., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50, supra note 454, ¶ 97.
Id. ¶ 98.
67
UN Human Rights U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, “I lost my dignity”: Sexual and
gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/CRP.3. ¶ 14,
49–50 (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Sexual and gender-based violence in Syria.].
68
The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50, supra note 45, ¶ 98.
69
Sexual and gender-based violence in Syria, supra note 67, ¶ 43.
70
Id. ¶ 44–50.
71
Id. ¶ 14.
72
Id. at Summary.
65
66

12

2020

The Price of Prosecution

8:1

from pro-government areas to rape and sexual violence.73 Contrary to
the findings regarding government forces, the Commission
determined that evidence does not exist, of the use of rape and sexual
violence by armed groups as a part of a systematic and widespread
practice to extract information, extract loyalty, and cause fear.74 Rather,
rape and sexual violence most often were used by non-government
forces in instances of exploitation, sectarianism, and revenge.75 For
instance in 2013, a family, suspected of being Shi’a, was travelling to
Damascus when they were stopped and subsequently raped by an
unknown opposition group.76 In another instance, a young Sunni girl
befriended government soldiers to ease her passage through a
checkpoint. The relationship between the girl and the soldiers was not
sexual; but the girl’s Facebook page depicted the Government of Syria
flag.77 The girl was consequently raped by FSA members for her alleged
support of the government.78 Armed groups also have used threats of
rape and sexual violence to pressure families into allowing their young
daughters to marry FSA fighters.79
The Commission found evidence of severe psychological,
mental, and social impacts by the use of rape and sexual violence.
Depression is prominent among the affected individuals while
adequate mental health facilities remain sparse.80 Furthermore,
established views of sexuality and marriage have created an
environment where interviewees described rape as worse than death.81
Men and boys subjected to rape and sexual violence described
overwhelming shame, impotency, and guilt. 82 Some women were
impregnated by rape. With the illegality of seeking abortion under
domestic law, women and girls face a range of dangerous situations:
either seek illegal or outsourced procedures for abortion or have the

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 52.
Id.
Id. ¶ 53.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id.
Id. ¶ 55.
Id. ¶ 94.
Id. ¶ 95.
Id. ¶ 96.
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child and face the societal and religious implications of having a child
of rape.83 Children who witnessed such sexual violence suffer
psychological and physical consequences including nightmares, bedwetting, shaking, inability to speak of the events, and trauma.84
III. PROSECUTORIAL AVENUES
Three arenas exist to pursue criminal prosecution of the
international law violations committed during the Syrian Civil War: (1)
ad hoc tribunals, including international and hybrid tribunals, (2) the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), and (3) domestic courts. While
each arena presents its own challenges, both of the international
routes, ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, have been institutionally
constructed in a manner that would make establishing jurisdiction over
Syria nearly impossible. Ad hoc tribunals are at the mercy of the United
Nations Security Council for authority to pursue prosecution. The
ICC, absent state party membership or state consent, is likewise reliant
on the Security Council for a grant of authority to exercise jurisdiction.
But in contrast to the previous two avenues, domestic courts are
exclusively independent of international authority and require no
further efforts to establish jurisdiction over the crimes committed in
Syria; rather, domestic courts present more internal issues concerning
the legitimacy and integrity of such existing institutions to deliver
justice. Considering each available prosecutorial channel will highlight
the improbable reality of each one propositioning itself as feasible
mechanism for justice.
A. Ad Hoc Tribunals
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”), established in 1993, rejuvenated the modern global
inclination toward ad hoc tribunals as the archetype for trying
individuals.85 Global governance saw court after court established, all
created with individualized mandates, from the civil war in Sierra
Id. ¶ 97–9.
Id. ¶ 100.
85
The Tribunal – Establishment, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/establishment.
83
84
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Leone to the genocide in Rwanda. As the frequency of these courts
grew, two categories of criminal courts emerged: (1) international
criminal courts, and (2) hybrid criminal courts.
International criminal courts, like the ICTY, export domestic
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to a
court comprised of international judges, attorneys, and law. 86 Hybrid
tribunals, the more fledgling forum, fuse components of international
prosecution with components of the local judiciary in an effort to bring
prosecution closer to the population and victims of impact.87
Irrespective of the variations in staff and law utilized by the two
categories, the ad hoc and international nature of these courts imply a
reliance on the United Nations as an organ to create and largely fund
the appropriate vehicle to carry out these prosecutions. All past ad hoc
tribunals, with the exception of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), which was established by a joint
agreement between the UN and the Cambodian government, have
been procured from a UN Security Council resolution, detailing the
individualized mandates of these mechanisms.88
Chapter VII of the UN charter for the Security Council has
evolved in its authority to create these prosecutorial mechanisms.
Article 39 of Chapter VII espouses the Security Council to “determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and . . . make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”89 Considering the broad nature of Article 39, interpretations
have since effectuated international mechanisms like the ICTY and

86
International and Hybrid Criminal Courts and Tribunals - United Nations and the
Rule
of
Law. ,
UNITED NATIONS,
www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematicareas/international-law-courts-tribunals/international-hybrid-criminal-courtstribunals/.
87
See generally Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Hybrid Courts-The Hybrid Category of a New
Type of International Crimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 190 (2006).
88
See Table 1 for UN Security Council Resolutions for tribunals examined.
89
The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII § 39 [hereinafter: UN U.N.
Charter.].
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hybrid mechanisms like the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”).90
But a critical component of the Security Council’s authority to
determine how and if such measures should be taken is the institutional
design of the Security Council, specifically the five permanent
members on the council.
Chapter V of the UN Charter dictates that China, France,
Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom individually bear
the right to veto any resolution passing through the Security Council.91
A reflection of post-World War II global order, any of the five
permanent members can effectively halt efforts by the council to
address threats and breaches of peace. Thus, all UN Security Council
resolutions are exclusively dependent on concurring approval by these
five countries. Five countries, out of a global world order consisting of
195 countries, control the existence and fate of international criminal
courts. Herein lies the first challenge ahead in pursuing individual
accountability for war crimes within Syria, specifically crimes by the
incumbent Assad regime.
Russia, wielding one of the five vetoes on the council, has
persisted as a staunch proponent of the Assad regime for the entirety
of the war, ensuring the Kremlin maintains the whole of its
geostrategic interests.92 Syria presents itself as an attractive contender
geographically, economically, and politically for Russia to root its stake
in the Middle East, an analogous counterpart to the U.S. foothold in
Saudi Arabia.93 The downfall of the Alawite Assad regime would
reorient regional dynamics, ushering in the already looming Sunnidominated order with Saudi Arabia and the United States at the head
of the table.94 With a Russian port in Tartus, the Kremlin holds a
critical passageway to the Mediterranean for economic and military
90
See S.C. Res. 827, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (May 25, 1993); see also S.C. Res. 1757, Establishment of a Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (May 30, 2007).
91
UN Charter, Chapter V § 27.
92
Roy Allison, Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis, 89
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 795, 796 (2013).
93
Id. at 808-09.
94
Hanna Notte, Russia in Chechnya and Syria: Pursuit of strategic goals, 23
MIDDLE EAST POLICY 59, 61. (2016).
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use.95 Combine all these interests together and the result is consistent
opposition to any UN led intervention in Syria and absolute rejection
of any attempt to proceed with action under Chapter VII of the UN
charter.96
Consequently, if the Assad regime is to stay in power and
Russia is to continue shielding the regime from the rest of the global
community, there will not be a UN resolution any time soon
authorizing the prosecution of any humanitarian law and human rights
violations that the regime may be guilty of. The closest thing we may
see to a viable attempt at retributive justice would be trying the crimes
committed by the regime’s armed opponents, which the UN has
documented evidence for.97 While holding these armed groups
accountable for violating international law is salient, the overwhelming
amount of international calls for justice are directed towards the crimes
of the Assad regime. Any prosecutions that exclude the high-ranking
officials within the regime would only rejuvenate the argument for
victor’s justice and potentially exacerbate sectarian tensions.
B. The International Criminal Court
The alternative international prosecutorial path would be
proceeding through the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),
established in 1998 as the first permanent international court. With the
intent to try individuals rather than states, the Court prosecutes four
main crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes of aggression.98 Thus, pursuing individual criminal liability for
Allison, supra note 92, at 807.
See
S.C.
Draft
Res.
321
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2018/321; UN Draft
Resolution S/(Apr. 10, 2018); S.C. Draft Res. 970 (Nov. 17, 2017/); S.C. Draft Res.
315 (Apr. 12, 2017); S.C. Draft Res. 1026; S.C. Draft Res. 348 (May 22, 2014).
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/970http://ww
w.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/315http://www.un.org/e
n/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1026http://www.un.org/en/ga/searc
h/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/348.
97
See Sieges as a weapon of war: Encircle, starve, surrender, evacuate, UN
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE SYRIAN ARAB
REPUBLIC REPORT (May 2018).
98
Rome Statute, supra note 12, at Part II.
95
96
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high-ranking officials within the regime would seem to be the next
logical option for Syrian transitional justice, given that the crimes of
the regime fall appropriately within the scope of the Court. However,
akin to the obstacles encountered when pursuing prosecution through
ad hoc tribunal, establishing appropriate ICC jurisdiction over the
Assad regime presents itself improbable and implausible.
The ICC has three means by which it can exercise jurisdiction
over a particular crime. First, Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute allows
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction through State Party referral.99 A state
that has signed and ratified the Rome Statute can refer alleged crimes
to the ICC prosecutor if they occurred on the territory of the State
Party or another State Party, or if the alleged crimes were committed
by a national from a State Party.100 Syria, though it signed the Rome
Statute, has yet to ratify it, and therefore, is not a member state to the
ICC. Consequently, to proceed down this path, the Syrian government
would need to ratify the Rome Statute. Given the domestic
circumstances for the incumbent regime and the turmoil embroiled by
the civil war, ratification of the Rome Statute would be a far from
pragmatic option.
Second, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute empowers the UN
Security Council to refer states to the ICC under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, irrespective of whether the referred state is a Rome
Statute signatory.101 As previously discussed when examining the
viability of a UN Security Council resolution to establish an Ad Hoc
tribunal, a web of geostrategic interests are so strongly weaved between
the Assad regime and Russia that any chances of a referral will be
halted at their inception. That is not to say an attempt hasn’t been
made—it has. In May of 2014, the Security Council voted on a
resolution to refer Syria to the ICC for investigation.102 Russia acted in
accordance with its geopolitical interests and vetoed the resolution.
Id. at art. 13(a).
Id. at art. 14.
101
Id. at art. 13(b).
102
”Somini Sengupta, China and Russia Block Referral of Syria to Court, New
York
N.
Y.
Times
(May
20,
2017,),
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/world/middleeast/syria-vote-in-securitycouncil.html.
99
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Moreover, China also exercised its veto power, in line with its stringent
opposition to any western imperialist practices that may usher in
regime change.103 Thus, two of five different players on the Security
Council maintain political coalitional restraints that, in turn, restrain
the Security Council from proceeding with any accountability measures
that could perturb the Assad regime and the current state of the nation.
The third jurisdictional trigger available to the ICC is a proprio
motu investigation under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 104 The ICC
prosecutor may choose to investigate alleged crimes that either
occurred on the territory, or by a national, of a State Party; or on the
territory, or by a national, of a non-State Party that has consented to
ICC jurisdiction. Again, akin to the challenges discussed previously,
consent to any ICC jurisdiction lies outside the incumbent regime’s
interests. The Assad regime is already facing a fragile legitimization of
their state power domestically. Any consent to foreign prosecution,
even if it were to only target a specific few high-ranking officials, would
not only shake their already teetering grasp on power, but would cast
open a wider vacuum for competing factions to take hold.
While these three avenues have historically been the only
options available to establish jurisdiction, the ICC recently unlocked a
fourth channel through which jurisdiction could be established. In
September of 2018, the ICC published a decision that would allow
prosecutors to pursue charges against officials of Myanmar, a state that
is not party to the ICC, has not been referred to the ICC by the UN
Security Council, nor has consented to ICC jurisdiction. The charges
were instead pursued by means of jurisdiction over neighboring
Bangladesh, which is a state party to the ICC.105 To be specific, the
prosecutors submitted a request to pursue charges of deportation and
forcible transfer of the Rohingya population from Myanmar to
103
See generally Markos Kounalakis, China’s position on international intervention:
A media and journalism critical discourse analysis of its case for “Sovereignty” versus
“Responsibility to Protect” principles in Syria, 1.3 GLOBAL MEDIA AND CHINA 149 (2016).
104
Proprio motu is Latin for “on one’s own initiative.” See Rome Statute, supra
note 12, at art. 15.
105
Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction
under Article 19(3) of the Statute,” ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision (Sept.6, 2018)
[hereinafter ICC Decision, Myanmar].
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Bangladesh under Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. 106 The Court
affirmed in its ruling that, while the Assembly of States of the United
Nations brought into existence the ICC, the judicial entity exists
independently and has continued in its existence with both
cooperation by State parties and non-State parties to prosecute the
most serious international crimes.107 Furthermore, it justified that the
exercise of jurisdiction is valid in that Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome
Statute dictates that the Court has jurisdiction if the conduct in
question occurred on the territory of a state party.108 Herein the Court
decided that these preconditions set out by Article 12 are minimum
standards which are fulfilled if at least one element of the crime
satisfies it.109 The conduct in question, being deportation and forcible
transfer of populations, in part took place on the territory of
Bangladesh, a state party, where the Rohingya populations settled as a
result of the deportations by Myanmar.110 As such, at least one element
of the crime meets the Article 12 criteria; thus, the entirety of the crime
was ruled as falling within ICC jurisdiction. The Court concluded, “the
Chamber is of the view that acts of deportation initiated in a State not
Party to the Statute (through expulsion or other coercive acts) and
completed in a State Party to the Statute (by virtue of victims crossing
the border to a State) fall within the parameters of article 12(2)(a) of
the Statute.”111
This 2018 decision has consequently created a precedent that
is now being used by attorneys to pursue charges against the Assad
regime. Lawyers have requested the ICC to investigate alleged crimes
by the Assad regime, using the September 2018 precedent.112 In this
case, refugees have fled to Jordan, a state party to the ICC, following
torture, abuse, violence, and widespread and systematic violations.113
Id. ¶ 52.
Id. ¶ 48.
108
Id. ¶ 64.
109
Id.
110
Id. ¶ 71.
111
Id. ¶ 73.
112
Lawyers Hope Refugees’ Case against Damascus Will Be Breakthrough,
THOMSON REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:30 AM), www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-refugees-icct/lawyers-hope-refugees-case-against-damascus-will-bebreakthrough-idUSKCN1QO1HD.
113
Id.
106
107

20

2020

The Price of Prosecution

8:1

Applying the same ruling from 2018 to this situation, prosecutors
could seek charges of individual criminal liability for crimes against
humanity, specifically deportation and other broader crimes that meet
Article 12(2)(a) for jurisdiction. At this point in time, the Court has not
published an opinion either rejecting or accepting jurisdiction but
based off of the precedent set in the fall of 2018, it would not seem
too far off for the ICC to have willfully created a fourth avenue by
which it could assert its own jurisdiction.
This path, however, is not absent its own drawbacks. Even if
the ICC were to accept jurisdiction, there exists a serious concern of
both cooperation and enforceability. Take, for example, the ICC case
against Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. With an indictment and
arrest warrants dating back to 2009, the president of Sudan has yet to
be detained and the ICC has yet to proceed with a trial. 114 Moreover,
while Sudan is not a State party to the ICC, Al Bashir has made
numerous visits to states that are party to the Rome Statute and who
were ordered to hand over Al Bashir.115 Despite these outstanding
warrants, state parties to the ICC, including Jordan, have refused to
cooperate. Herein lies largely the flaw of the ICC: its exclusive reliance
on state cooperation to function.116 The Rome Statute lacks any
repercussions for state parties that fail to fulfill their obligations as a
member; in fact, Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute specifically defers
authority to the United Nations in situations of non-compliance by
state parties.117 Even with a referral to the United Nations,
repercussions remain unlikely. The UN charter allows suspension of a
state following a recommendation by the Security Council, and
subsequently, a state can be expelled if the state continues to violate its
obligations upon a two thirds vote by the General Assembly and

”Al Bashir Case.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, www.icccpi.int/darfur/albashir.
115
Tom White, States ‘Failing to Seize Sudan’s Dictator despite Genocide Charge’,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2018, 2:00 AM EDT), www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2018/oct/21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrestwarrant.
116
Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement
Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34 FORDHAM INT’L LJL.J.
1585, 1595. (2010).
117
Rome Statute, supra note 12, at para 87(7).
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absent any veto by the Security Council.118 As was the situation in the
Al Bashir case, the ICC referred Jordan to the United Nations for
failure to detain and surrender Al Bashir, but as of today, no formal
actions have been taken to sanction or punish Jordan for failure to
comply.119 Applying this fallibility to the case at hand, there remains a
high chance that even with an indictment of senior officials of the
Assad regime, prosecution would be halted at its early stages,
particularly because the path of indictment being tried is through
Jordan, a state that has already demonstrated a willingness to ignore its
obligations to the ICC. Without collective state cooperation to detain
and surrender those implicated in charges, ICC prosecution, even with
appropriate jurisdiction, remains distant.
C. Domestic Courts
Even if the international community fails in its endeavors to
pursue retributive justice, enthusiasm persists for justice to cascade,
albeit, through the domestic court system. But this alternative
maintains its own shortcomings, once again beating down hopes for
Syrian justice and accountability through prosecution. While domestic
courts would bring the process of accountability and retribution closer
to the victims, a domesticized process without exhaustive reform
would only polarize the country even further, leaving it susceptible to
fall back into cyclical violence. The main concern with domestic
prosecution would be the prevalence of judicial corruption. Given
Syria, prior to the war, was not active in its exercise of due process of
law and constitutionalism, it would be fair to assume that the state of
the judiciary following the war would either be the same if not worse.120
Add looming victor’s justice to the already rampant corruption and the
result is a pseudo-court system with the Assad regime using the courts
to target any and all members of the opposition.

UN Charter, supra note 89, at art. 5-6.
Al Bashir Case: ICC Appeals Chamber Invites Observations from International
Organisations, States Parties and Professors of International Law on Legal Matters Raised by
Jordan, ICC (Mar. 29, 2018), www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1375..
120
See generally Abdulkader Al-Sheikh and Abdullah Hamadah, Corruption in
Syria Causes, Effects, and Anti-Corruption Strategies, SYRIAN ECON. F. (2014).
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It is also critical not to forget the size of the task that the
domestic courts would have to undertake. Diving into nine plus years
of war and a continually growing number of varying factions, both
native and foreign, the courts would require a hefty source of funding
to embark on such a project, from staff to investigative teams to even
infrastructure like buildings and offices. Furthermore, because the
prosecutions would be operating in a domestic setting, outside of
international donors, the funding would most likely be sourced by the
local population, namely the same victims requiring rehabilitation and
justice. Ergo, Syrians would be diverting money away from local
infrastructural and institutional reconstruction toward prosecution that
focuses on the same individuals who caused the destruction in the first
place.
Nevertheless, even if the judiciary did conduct transformative
internal reforms and even if there were sufficient resources available
to funds the court’s escapades, there still remains the lingering
sectarianism pulling at the country’s fabrics.121 An amalgam of varying
religious, ethnic, and ideological circles, Syria’s modern political history
has been shaped by a minority sect ruling over a disparate majority
through systematic authoritarianism. To ignore this prevalent
sectarianism when proceeding with domestic prosecution would only
add insult to injury. Prosecution may produce an ephemeral tone of
“justice” but may also lack any of the substantive societal implications
such as local reconciliation and reconstruction. Domestic prosecution,
without the efforts of an impartial international player, could
exacerbate already fragile relationships. The pursuit of justice would in
its entirety be halted if the country were to be plunged back into
cyclical sectarian violence.
IV. EVALUATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
Despite the above-mentioned challenges, global discourse
predominately favors international prosecution as the solution to the

See generally Frederic C. Hof and Alex Simon, Sectarian violence in Syria’s civil
war: Causes, consequences, and recommendations for mitigation, CENTER FOR THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, U NITED STATES HOLOCAUST MUSEUM (2013).
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Syrian crisis.122 While optimism for justice is critical and owed to the
Syrian people, it is equally as critical to spend time and resources
efficiently, creating realistic frameworks for transitional justice that
work for all the people of Syria. At the end of the day romanticized
notions of punishment and accountability do little for the victims who
are left without resources, without jobs, without infrastructure, and
without human rights. Thus, even if an international criminal tribunal
were able to come to fruition, it is imperative to understand the
associated strings attached to such a mechanism—strings that could
make prosecution an unattractive, injurious instrument as a vehicle for
sham justice. Understanding the implications of a future tribunal
means understanding the efficacy of past international tribunals.
Measuring efficacy is not a simple task. Part of the problem lies
in the fact that defining “success” for these international criminal
courts remains contentious. One view of success could be whether the
court has prosecuted as many international law violators as possible.
Another view of success could be whether there has been an
installation and maintenance of peace and democracy. With varying
definitions for success comes varying views on the efficacy of these
tribunals. There surely is no one correct way to evaluate efficacy. Thus,
here we attempt to holistically evaluate past international criminal
courts by looking at a number of considerations that might impact
success: monetary cost, time, procurement of evidence, and legitimacy
of the process. We conclude this evaluation by examining the influence
of these past courts on the level of freedoms enjoyed within each
targeted country.
First, we start with cost. Trials are expensive and long. This is
true whether you examine domestic or international trials.
Investigations are lengthy, overhead costs for court in session are high,
and sometimes the outcome is not always what the victim wants or
needs. But take the already complex nature of domestic trials, throw in
122
See Those Responsible for War Crimes in Syria ‘Will Be Held Accountable for What
They Have Done,’ Says UN Rights Chief, UN NEWS (Mar. 2, 2018),
news.un.org/en/story/2018/03/1003981.; See also Syria: Criminal Justice for Serious
Crimes under International Law , HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Dec. 17, 2013, 12:00 AM
EST),
www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/17/syria-criminal-justice-serious-crimesunder-international-law#IV-Conclusion.
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different players from across the world, add in inaccessible evidence,
and mix in a brand-new legal code for the proceedings; the result is an
exponentially more convoluted, costly trial with a low conviction rate.
This begs the question: at what point does the cost outweigh the value
of these proceedings?
When examining the history of the price of prosecution, the
different types of international courts have to be taken into
consideration to provide a holistic depiction of the range of costs that
can be expected, from a small tribunal designed to address one specific
event to a large tribunal designed to address years of armed conflict
and violence. And while a holistic picture of the cost of tribunals can
highlight key differences between the courts and the administration of
the courts, it can also highlight key consistencies between them. The
most obvious being the staggeringly high estimated total cost and the
staggeringly low conviction rate.
<Table 1>
For instance, take the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”), a
tribunal that’s been active for the past ten years following the terrorist
attack on February 14, 2005, that killed former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty-two others while injuring over 200
individuals.123 The tribunal’s mandate is to address this precise attack,
with conditional extended jurisdiction to address other terrorist crimes
around this time period in Lebanon if the Court finds that these attacks
were all interrelated.124 With a decade under its belt and half a billions
dollars spent, all the STL has to show is nine indictments, four of
which were indictments on charges of contempt for unauthorized
release of confidential information related to ongoing STL cases.125
Thus, only five indictments were on charges related to the February
14th attack.126 Furthermore, one of the five accused died before the trial
concluded, while the remaining four accused are fugitives with

See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, www.stl-tsl.org/en/.
S.C. Res 1757, Annex, art. 1. (May 30, 2007).
125
See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 123, The Cases. For estimated
total cost of the tribunal, see Table 1.
126
Id.
123
124
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outstanding warrants for their arrest.127 Half a billion dollars spent for
no arrests, no convictions, and no clear indication of who was
responsible for the attack. Additionally, the budget was funded 51%
by voluntary contributions from member states in the UN and the
remaining 49% by the people of Lebanon through taxes. 128 This was
already a high burden for a country that was on shaky economic
grounds; but then, within the first two years of the establishment of
the court, Lebanon began hosting its first wave of Syrian refugees,
reaching more than 1.5 million refugees in 2014. 129 By 2015, the
unemployment rate in Lebanon had reached 20% and public debt had
widened to 150% of the GDP.130 This version of justice has been
defined by the victims themselves funding a court that is costly and
inaccessible to the people. Rather than use that money to recoup the
victims and their families following the attack, the country under
international auspices proceeded down a path that has only devoured
time and resources all the while allowing the alleged perpetrators to
escape without a trace. The people of Lebanon bore the high cost of
the tribunal without receiving any yield from the proceedings thus far.
If this is the cost of justice, it is too high for justice not delivered,
especially when Lebanon opted out of prosecuting individuals
responsible for heinous violence that led to over 144,000 individuals
being killed during the fifteen-year civil war (1975-1990).131
On the other end of the spectrum, there are trials like the
ICTY, designed to address years of violence and abuses, rather than a
particular individual event. The ICTY, active for a little over two
decades, was contrived to end a culture of impunity and to “help pave
the way for reconciliation.”132 That “reconciliation” was funded by
more than two billion dollars. The ICTY undeniably did indict more
Id.
S.C. Res 1757, art. 5 (May 30, 2007).
129
ILO Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/syrian-refugee-crisis/lebanon/lang-en/index.htm.
130
The World Bank in Lebanon, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 1, 2019),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/overview.
131
Faten Ghosn and Amal Khoury, Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or the
Illusion of Peace?, 65 THE MIDDLE EAST Journal J. 381, 382 (2011).
132
About the ICTY International, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, www.icty.org/en/about.
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than 150 individuals, more than half of which were convicted.133 But
convictions alone are not sufficient to reconcile societies fractured by
sectarianism. One survey found that the ICTY did little to transform
relationships among the varying ethnic and religious communities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with most people reporting an unwillingness
to forget and reconcile the crimes committed by other groups.134 Not
only did the ICTY fail in rehabilitating these relationships, it actually
aggravated them by reaffirming group identity. Finding the accused
guilty solidifies narratives that criminalize the other side.135
Accordingly, the more the ICTY was “successful” in its convictions,
the stronger the enemy images would grow within each community.
Those deteriorated inter-ethnic community networks were also further
braced by the Dayton accords, which established a consociational
government along ethnic lines.136
A catch-22 thus evolves out of retributive justice. On the one
hand, if the proceedings result in no convictions, an air of impunity
survives with the high cost lingering as a reminder of the wasted
resources. On the other hand, if the proceedings result in plentiful
convictions, a silent consequence arises further fracturing of relations
between the varying local groups that prompted the abuses in the first
place. This leaves the country vulnerable to fall back into cycles of
violence. With a history of international tribunals costing at least
fourteen million dollars per indicted person, it is worth investigating
why tribunals of these types cost so much and whether these funds
would be better used elsewhere in the pursuit of transitional justice. 137
International tribunals incur similar expenses as domestic
trials, with the exception being the cost of travel and the international
nature of the tribunals complicating the costs incurred. For instance,
domestic trials incur costs such as judge salaries, attorney salaries,

133
Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, www.icty.org/node/9590.
134
Roland Kostić, Transitional justice and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Whose memories, whose justice, 54 SOCIOLOGIJA 649, 653- 59 (2012).
135
Id. at 658.
136
Dayton Accords, Annex 4, art. IV.
137
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courtroom staff salaries, facility costs, and security cost.138 As the
nature of the case grows more complicated, so do the associated costs.
And the reasoning is evident: the more complicated a case, the longer
the trial will be, thus the higher the costs.139 The same reasoning applies
to international tribunals and their cases. The cases are riddled with
such a high degree of complexity that the associated costs are
significantly higher than we would see for an ordinary domestic trial.
The complexity is spurred by a number of different factors.
First, the accused are often charged with a higher number of
offenses than domestic indictments, extending the length of the
trials.140 Because of the degree of these crimes, the tribunals will hear
more and longer witness testimonies. 141 Attorneys will use more time
and resources to address these witness testimonies and the judges will
take longer filtering admissible evidence. Furthermore, these witnesses
often need to be flown into the country housing the tribunal.
This relates to the second factor that complicates and increases
the overall cost of tribunals: investigations. The investigative stage of
international proceedings often takes longer because the evidence is
harder to reach, a longer time period passes between the crime and the
initiation of investigation, and international travel of varying
investigators is required to retrieve such evidence. Additionally, the
reliance on state cooperation leaves the court in a precarious position;
in contrast to a domestic court where systems are already in place to
do much of the pretrial legwork including arrests and evidence
retrieval, international courts must staff their own groups to go into
the relevant states to detain the accused, perform forensic
investigations, and find witnesses to testify.142
Third, the court is left using more resources and time to create
codified procedural and substantive law to guide the trial. 143 In a
138
David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 American Journal of
International Law AM. J. INT’L L. 861, 864-68. (2006).
139
Id. at 873.
140
Id. at 876.
141
Id.
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domestic trial, the law is already laid out; practically no time is spent
creating the law before the proceedings. In contrast, international
tribunals lack codified precedent to go off of, thus novel issues arise
related to the scope of the tribunal’s reach, admissibility questions, and
to the elements in contention. Additionally, the cost of detention and
sentences of the accused and guilty persons adds to the total bill,
particularly if the accused are sentenced to lifetime in prison.
International tribunals under the auspices of the UN prohibit the death
penalty, thus the highest sentence possible is a lifetime imprisonment
paid for either by the state itself or by other states that have yielded to
house these convicted individuals. 144 Put all these factors together and
international prosecution becomes exponentially more intricate than
any domestic proceeding.
Another consideration in evaluating international criminal
courts is the procurement of evidence. Due process of law survives in
international adjudication; therefore, prosecutors bear the burden of
proof, onus probandi, such that without substantive evidence, no accused
may be found guilty.145 Implicitly, prosecutors are tasked with
developing new investigative strategies to retrieve necessary but
inaccessible evidence for the trials at hand. The origin of this authority
lies in the peculiar disposition of the evidence required to determine
the culpability of the accused on trial. Pair a need for evidence that is
often inaccessible with that the absence of a singular codified set of
rules detailing how prosecutors may obtain evidence, and the
procurement of evidence grows to be one of the biggest obstacles
encountered by international criminal courts.
In contrast to national court systems, international criminal
courts operate outside of state institutions that function hand in hand
with the judiciary. Instead, international criminal courts establish their
own mechanisms to replace those of the national institutions that a
court would normally rely on for fact finding and evidence gathering.
The authority to establish such mechanisms lies in Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, with the exception of the ICC where it lies in the de jure

Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54 International INT’L
Comparative Law Quarterly & COMP. L. Q., 357, 366 (2005).
145
James B. Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARV. L. REV. 45, 46 (1890):).
144

29

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:1

obligations created by the Rome Statute.146 The prosecutors are
endowed with the responsibility to use this authority to retrieve
evidence necessary to substantiate any claims made; but given that state
consent is not always present, the prosecutors are obligated to
maneuver their way through geopolitical hurdles to acquire whatever
unknown evidence may exist. Take the ICTY for instance. The UN
required all states to cooperate with the ICTY’s investigations; but,
absent an enforcement mechanism and formal operations to instigate
such investigations, the ICTY was left without a capacity to oblige
states to comply with what was asked.147 Consequently, the Chief
Prosecutors were charged with leading the investigation phase of the
tribunals by expanding their military and political networks to increase
their resources, expand their powers, and gain access to places and
people they would otherwise be excluded from.148 As demonstrated, a
dangerous interdependence emerges between the prosecutors and
state officials. State officials get to decide what and whom prosecutors
have access to, leaving room for victor’s justice to play a role in the
procurement of evidence for indictments and trials.
This leaves room to question the reliability and the justiciability
of the evidence gathered by the prosecutors. While the prosecutors
maintain the higher burden of proof, the defense still retains the right
to rebut any prosecutorial claims by making assertions of their own.
Yet without safeguard institutions in place to protect the balanced
collection of evidence, the defense is only able to sift through evidence
produced by the prosecution.149 In the case of the ICTR, defense
counsel was not only blocked by the Rwandan government from
interviewing potential witnesses, but they were also threatened and
arrested for proceeding with investigations of their own. 150 Despite an

Cogan, Jacob Katz. Cogan, The problem of obtaining evidence for international
criminal courts, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 404, 405 (2000).
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79 Law and Contemporary Problems. 289, 303 (2016).
148
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149
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TERRORISM 51 (2018).
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appearance of due process, there exists an inequity in resources
between the prosecution and the defense within international criminal
courts, affording the prosecution more power under the law. 151
Procedural legitimacy of this process becomes even more
dubious when the staffing of these courts is investigated. Because of
previously mentioned resource and financial constraints, the staffing
of these ad hoc courts can often include unqualified, ill-informed
personnel. During the formation of the ICTY, such a heavy focus was
placed on the Rules of Evidence and Procedure that the primarily
international staff and management were largely neglected.152 As a
result, integral players in the prosecutorial process, including attorneys,
investigators, and judges, were left ignorant of relevant circumstances
and viewpoints. This fostered insensitivity to the targeted ethnic
populations, delegitimizing the process in the eyes of many of the
victims. On the other end of the scale, staff sourced from local
populations proved concerning for the ECCC as evidence arose that
individuals were bribing Cambodian government officials for positions
within the tribunal.153 There is legitimate skepticism in whether the
process is designed to be fair. Not only are these courts reliant on the
approval and funding by the permanent five members of the Security
Council, but also, their inherent design is to go after a specified group
of individuals. Thus, there exists little incentive to provide the
defendants with adequate resources to prove their innocence. This was
quite clear in the case of the SCSL, as the defense team received a very
modest budget, making it one of the lowest ever allocated for legal aid
for accused individuals. 154 In addition, given the funding mechanism
(i.e. donation based) of the majority of the tribunals, many defendants
filed petitions against the SCSL claiming that donors compromise the
independence of judges.155 When the budget is limited or gets cut,
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Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 353, 355 (2000).
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those that pay the price are the defendants and victims. 156 As long as
an appearance of fairness survives, there is no higher authority that can
combat inequality within the process. This draws doubt on the type of
rule of law created by these systems.
Moving beyond the due process deficit in the procurement of
evidence by the prosecution and defense, we also find logistical
challenges in just evaluating evidence once it has been retrieved. First,
the mere volume of evidence that the parties and the arbitrator must
decipher proves time consuming.157 Witness testimony, both written
affidavits and oral statements, has evolved to become a prominent
player in these trials.158 Thus, prosecutors and defense attorneys are
required to sift through interviews and statements to evaluate the
reliability and the admissibility of this evidence. Without a set of rules
to guide admissibility, this process is similar to navigating through the
dark.
Second, language complicates percolating through the
evidence.159 Given the international nature of the court, translations
are required for every step of the process, with attorneys, judges, and
witnesses varying in the use of primary languages.160 But more than just
translating documents and witness statements, all parties involved have
to be hyper-aware of the impact of language on decisions and on the
arbiter of fact.
Third, the free rein on admissible evidence entails longer trials,
more evidence to consider, and stronger discretion by the judges to
either give evidence different weights or to exclude the evidence all
together.161 Both the ICTY and the ICTR shared the same rule on
evidence: “A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it
deems to have probative value.”162 Thus, practically no evidence is ever
Id. at 429.
Rutledge, Kristina D. Rutledge, ‘Spoiling Everything’—But for Whom? Rules
of Evidence and International Criminal Proceedings, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 151, 151 (2003).
158
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160
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excluded during these proceedings, despite doubts of credibility and
chances of prejudice. With the inclusion of all evidence, the
prosecutors and the defense have to rely more on the judges to trust
that they will give the evidence the weight it deserves, rather than rely
on safeguards to preclude unnecessarily pernicious evidence.163 This
judicial empowerment can raise concerns, especially when cases of
judicial impropriety arise, such as the case of the ECCC.164
If such a costly mechanism is to be used, there needs to be, at
the minimum, an assurance that the apparatus produces intended
consequences—that retributive justice will achieve the goals it was
designed to accomplish. If such an endeavor is to be undertaken, the
product that the international community is buying into should
certainly meet expectations. Both UN resolutions that established the
international tribunals for Yugoslavia (UNSCR 827) and Rwanda
(UNSCR 955) maintained that the tribunals would contribute to the
process of reconciliation and “the restoration and maintenance of
peace.”165 Within the international community, there exists an
underlying belief that trials will: (1) improve human rights protections
and diminish repression,166 (2) have a deterrent effect,167 (3) contribute
to the development of liberal democracy,168 and (4) guide the reform
of the national criminal justice system as well as promote the rule of
law.169

in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia., Rules of Procedure and Evidence r. 89(3)
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However, while advocates of tribunals argue that retributive
justice is the most pertinent, and for some the only, response to
addressing human rights and humanitarian law violations, several
scholars have cautioned against such an approach, even questioning
the relationship between trials and post-conflict peacebuilding. For
instance, Lie, Binningsbo and Gates find that trials have a weak and
inconsistent effect on the durability of peace.170 On the other hand,
Meernick, Nichols and King171 as well as Olsen, Payne and Reiter172
conclude that countries that experience only trials are no more or less
likely to experience recurrence of violence or witness improvements in
human rights practices and democracy than countries that do not have
any prosecutions.
<Table 2>
Given the mixed empirical findings in the literature on the
relationship between countries that have prosecutions and those that
have not, we turn to take a look at how the tribunals mentioned in
Table 1 have affected each of the states that were involved.
Investigating the efficacy of tribunals through paradigmatic goals of
liberal democracy and individual values, it would be expected that an
effective mechanism would demonstrate consistent success. Table 2,
outlining freedom levels of countries post-tribunal, casts international
prosecution in a bleaker light than the narrative that primarily
dominates the field of transitional justice.173 It is evident that even after
twenty-six years following the establishment of the ICTY, the states
that make up former Yugoslavia have varied from being free (Croatia,
Serbia and Slovenia) to partly free (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia,
and Montenegro). As for Rwanda, the country is still considered not
free with severe threats on political and civil liberties, despite
See generally Scott Gates, Helga Malmin Binningsbo, and Tove Grete Lie,
Post-conflict justice and sustainable peace, THE WORLD BANK (2007).
171
See generally James D., Meernik, Angela Nichols, and Kimi L. King, The
impact of international tribunals and domestic trials on peace and human rights after civil war, 11
INT’L STUD. PERSP. 309, (2010).
172
See generally Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, & Andrew G. Reiter,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING
EFFICACY (2010).
173
FREEDOMHOUSE. Freedom levels in 2018 are based on an evaluation of
political rights and civil liberties.
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guarantees in the constitution. Pair Cambodia’s freedom level (not
free) with its estimated total cost ($300 million) and it becomes unclear
if the investment in such an apparatus is producing any beneficial
outcome, particularly for the victims of the armed conflict.
<Table 3>
Proponents of retributive justice further maintain that
tribunals offer justice and accountability, but just as importantly they
normalize the rule of law. However, if we take a look at the impact of
the ICTY on each of the states that emerged from the dissolution of
Yugoslavia we, again, find mixed results in terms of the level of the
rule of the law in each of the countries (see Table 3). 174 Despite the
same ad hoc institution pursuing aims of accountability and justice, the
effects vary across the board. On one end, Slovenia has benefitted with
a rule of law score at 14/16. On the other end, however, Bosnia and
Herzegovina suffer weak rule of law (score of 7/16) with a fragmented
judiciary, inconsistent guarantees of due process of law, and rampant
discrimination both within and by state institutions.175 One of the main
reasons we see such a difference in the scores for the rule of law is due
to the variation in the level of independence of the judiciary, guarantees
of due process, corruption and patronage within the justice system as
well as discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities across the
different states that emerged. Despite an estimated total cost of $2.3
billion, the emerging states of the former Yugoslavia experienced
disparate impacts following prosecution, with some benefiting and
some remaining predisposed to injustice. As such, funding such an
institution might prove to be an unproductive endeavor considering
the absence in consistency of success.

174
FREEDOMHOUSE. Rule of law is a subcategory of civil liberties within the
freedom levels. A country is awarded 0 to 4 points on 4 different questions regarding
rule of law, with a score of 0 representing the lowest degree of freedom and a score
of 4 representing the highest degree of freedom.
175
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
Profile,
FREEDOMHOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/bosnia-and-herzegovina.
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V. ALTERNATIVES TO RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
One of the main issues that arises with retributive forms of
transitional justice is that retribution ignores the nexus between state
fragility, socio-economic inequity, and self-perpetuating cycles of
violence. Imbalances in social capital paired with highly fallible
institutions fosters an environment hospitable to communal violence.
Irrespective of the number of perpetrators indicted and convicted, if a
country transitioning out of war is unable to transform away from its
previous condition, it is left vulnerable to the divisive issues that led to
the armed conflict in the first place. Looking past retributive justice,
we find restorative justice, aimed at reconstruction, reparations, and
reconciliation, not just at an institutional level, but more importantly,
at grassroots, interpersonal level.
A. Reconstruction
Reconstruction can and should occur in three distinct
dimensions: (1) political, (2) security, and (3) economic. Syria’s current
environment, even before the end of armed conflict, is ripe to receive
new practices, policies, and pillars to create a new state foundation,
both on a national level and on a local level. Particular to
reconstruction would be the redistribution and balance of social capital
among the varying ethno-religious and political sects throughout Syria,
with a specific focus on transforming and rehabilitating the
relationships of the different groups that comprise the Syrian
population. While the reconstruction of the three dimensions is going
to look quite different among them, it should remain that they are
consistent in integrating power-sharing arrangements to breed security
and stability.176 Power sharing arrangements ensure that all groups are
afforded protections and equity in their share of state power and social
capital, preventing one group from overpowering another.177

176
Amal Khoury and Faten Ghosn, Bridging Elite and Grassroots Initiatives: The
Road to Sustainable Peace in Syria, in POST-CONFLICT POWER-SHARING AGREEMENTS.
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Political reconstruction, with power sharing arrangements in
mind, needs to accommodate the diverse ethnic, religious, and political
makeup of Syria. Especially considering the sectarian nature of the war,
any political arrangement moving forward must be encompassing of
the different cleavages in a manner that balances the shares of
authority. Khoury and Ghosn suggest integrative consociationalism as
the political power sharing arrangement for Syria. 178 This system fuses
traditional
consociationalism,
guaranteeing
proportional
representation for the varying cleavages, with an integrative system,
that moves towards a more centralized national identity.179 Here, the
hybrid system would envelop and protect the ethno-cultural cleavages
under one umbrella of unified national identity.
This begs the question: should the country proceed with a
campaign of lustration, universal amnesty, or meet somewhere in the
middle? Considering all sides of the war are guilty of war crimes, a
purge of officials loyal to the former regime would be contrary to
national reconstruction efforts by signifying that supporters of the
former regime are disparately being punished more than the other sides
of the war. Additionally, an exhaustive purge of government officials
could create a personnel dilemma by disqualifying a large portion of
technocrats that might be essential to administrative and specialized
roles within the government.180 On the other hand, universal amnesty
could preclude bureaucratic reform by diminishing the integrity of
power sharing and accountability within the new regime. The
equilibrium to this dilemma would be fusing a comprehensive vetting
system while excising the individuals that present the greatest
detriment to reform. It is critical though that those individuals that are
removed from civil service are provided with economic security, by
means of pensions and severance packages, to ensure they do not fall
vulnerable to unemployment and the same economic grievances that
drove the country to conflict in the first place.181

Khoury and Ghosn, supra note 176, at 49.
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Establishing a legitimate monopoly over the use of force is
necessary in safeguarding against the machine of civil violence.
Normative security sector reform (“SSR”) addresses institutional
security deficits through a state-centric lens.182 Primarily, SSR leads
with the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of factional
forces.183 This provides that the new security apparatus co-opts
militant groups who took to arms during the war. If the new military
is unable to co-opt certain groups, the new security apparatus must
ensure it can curb the influence of such armed groups as to weaken
any spoiler effect they may have on the new fledgling institution and
civil peace. While this unquestionably addresses certain sectarian
issues, there additionally needs to be an underlying redevelopment of
trust between state institutions and civil society.184 This can be
spearheaded by efforts to reorganize security sector mechanisms
around a normative legal framework that stresses transparency,
accountability, and the protection of liberties, particularly for any
minorities. Furthermore, similar to political reconstruction, a system
of vetting should be utilized to ensure administrative technocrats
within the security apparatus can remain, while those that pose the
largest detriments to the integrity of the institution are removed,
creating room for more participation by the historically marginalized
populations.
The length of the conflict in Syria, eight years of economic
infrastructural destruction, combined with the economic grievances
that existed prior to the conflict has bred conditions that make
economic reconstruction a necessity, rather than a suggestion. Any
reconstruction that does not transform the economic status quo would
be reconstruction that is ignorant of the economic component to civil
violence. Power sharing arrangements within the economic domain
would address structural inequities that engender inter-group
resentment and violence. Additionally, only when a country is
financially stable can it begin to realistically examine retributive justice
mechanisms to combat impunity and build a culture of accountability.
Alan Bryden, Towards a Security Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding, 24 SICHERHEIT UND FRIEDEN (S+ F)/SECURITY and& PEACE 22, 23
(2006).
183
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For instance, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter found that high- and middleincome countries were more likely to utilize trials for justice, while low
income countries were more likely to use amnesty for justice. 185 Thus,
to even begin a realistic discussion of punishment and deterrence,
economic reconstruction has to be prioritized. Khoury and Ghosn
suggest an adoption scheme, as was used in Lebanon, to help fund
bottom-up efforts at economic revitalization.186 In this way, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), international governmental
organizations (“IGOs”), other states can directly fund and compensate
grassroots projects aimed at the rebuilding of infrastructure and
homes, social and psychological rehabilitation of civil society, and
creating a balance of access to economic welfare for all cleavages,
ensuring no one group monopolizes these resources. 187 This scheme
ensures enough financial flexibility to allow a manifold of programs to
be established that tailor to the needs of particular regions, while
simultaneously providing room for the government to undertake
internal reconstruction measures without the weight of an unilateral
national economic transformation.
B. Reparations
Reparations can work as a compliment rather than a standalone mechanism to economic reconstruction and the broader aims of
transitional justice. Reparations, as a vehicle for restorative justice,
explicitly address the damages and injuries to victims and families of
victims. The need for such an apparatus has even been addressed by
the UN, which has created a framework for post-armed conflict states
to work with to address victim needs following mass violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 188
Reparations pairs with reconstruction in that victim recognition is
emphasized simultaneously with state reform, ensuring that trust and
social parity is enshrined in the transitional process. It is critical,
however, that reparations are not approached with a traditional lens
185
Tricia D., Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, At What Cost?
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that is molded around domestic forms of damages for civil injuries.
Such mechanisms rely solely on state instituted reparation programs
comprising only of material compensation to restore victims back to
their original state prior to the injury. This vehicle is unrealistic for
Syria considering both the sheer number of victims to be repaired and
the financial incapacity and relative weakness of the state. Thus,
programs for reparations, akin to the economic reconstruction
discussed above, should expand beyond state administered programs
to include third parties such as other states and NGOs, as well as
diversify its capital of reparations to include both material and
symbolic redress across a spectrum targeting individuals and
communities.189
As was recommended for economic reconstruction, an adoption
scheme can provide the financial means to pursue programs of redress
by expanding the pool of sources from which compensation and
projects can be drawn. For instance, following the 2006 war in
Lebanon, Qatar took lead in bypassing the Lebanese government to
directly compensate victims in some of the most damaged parts of the
country, including Aynata, Beint Jbeil, and Khiam. 190 Victims would
submit claims to the local Qatari office, which upon review, would
issue checks directly back to the victims.191 Such forms of
compensation can address housing damages, loss of income, and
treatment for physical and mental health. Beyond such individualized
material compensation, the adoption scheme can be also used to establish
community programs, including educational grants and health
services.192 Reparations can thus induce the early stages of socioeconomic justice while concurrently working with reconstruction
projects to provide the needed state infrastructure to not only maintain

189
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190
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such progress but to also bridge grassroots efforts with broader,
national efforts.
C. Reconciliation
A consistent theme throughout non-retributive justice is the
transformation of relationships throughout society. Without targeting
the crux of the social breakdown that allowed such violence and
dehumanization to occur, groups are going to maintain their narrative
that perpetuates an “us” vs. “them” dimension. Scholars warn of the
impact of enemy images- the perpetual cycle that moves from hostile
images to violence back to a self-reinforcing hostile image of the
“other” by providing evidence of the “other’s” ill intentions. 193 To halt
such cycles, the relationships and the images have to be reimagined.
Integral to reimagining relationships for the future is understanding the
relationships of the past.
A truth and reconciliation commission should be established,
to provide an exhaustive history of all the abuses and human rights
violations committed by all actors in the war for all communities
throughout Syria. In contrast to trials where individual criminal liability
is emphasized, truth commissions aim to create a single narrative that
encompasses all of the crimes committed by all party sides to the
armed conflict. This compiled narrative thus creates a new collective
identity.194 With such a comprehensive documented history, areas
within state institutions that require the most reform can be uncovered,
necessary reparations to certain victimized communities can be
outlined, and projects can be undertaken to begin social and
psychological healing at the most grassroots level possible.
Furthermore, similar to the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the International Impartial

193
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194
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and Independent Mechanism, the documentation of such abuses can
be stored for later prosecutorial use.
Local control over reconciliation, which has already emerged
even in the midst of continuing armed conflict, is pivotal in allowing
for a peacebuilding process that is individualized and sensitive to the
particular regions and communities it is affecting. Moreover, it allows
for a grassroots level of accountability and transparency within the
rebuilding process, safeguarding that the products of such endeavors
are sustainable. For instance, in Al -Waar, a town in the Homs
governorate that witnessed a large amount of sectarian violence, the
local council took part in a series of negotiations over the course of a
year with both the Regime, rebels, and Russian forces.195 Despite many
obstacles to negotiations, the council was able to ensure a halt to
hostilities, access to humanitarian assistance, prisoner exchanges, and
general disarmament.196 Because of the work by the local council,
residents reported improved living conditions, including increased
access to basic goods, increased freedom of movement, and an
increased feeling of safety.197 In addition to local governance, initiatives
for reconciliation have been spearheaded by community leaders,
women’s groups, youth initiatives, religious leaders, and various other
civil society organizations.198 In some cases, these groups have
approached reconciliation through a teaching lens, convening
workshops and open forums to discuss conflict resolution, violence
prevention, battling sectarian rhetoric, and coexistence.199
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VI. CONCLUSION
When assessing Syria’s future in terms of transitional justice, it
can be easy to get caught in a maelstrom of romanticized, neoliberal
views on justice: punishing the guilty, while avenging the victims. Syria
has certainly proven to be one of the worst atrocities in contemporary
history, with media and mass communication bringing the destruction
of the war to our living rooms half a world away. At no point should
it be doubted that those that have committed the worst of crimes need
to be held accountable; they need to pay the price for crimes they have
committed and the lives they have taken. But by the same token, the
people of Syria, those whom were devastated by the war, those whose
livelihoods have been swept away, those that remain to find their
county broken, deserve to have realistic and effective mechanisms in
place to transition their country away from armed conflict into a new
period of restoration. In the case of Sierra Leone, the running joke was
that every single detainee at the Special Council had gained weight
during incarceration due to the quality of food, while detainees at
regular courts were packed in prison cells like meat freezers200 and
amputee victims were begging on the streets for food.201 Similarly,
victims in the Ugandan conflict noted how Dominic Ongwen, who
was on trial for seventy counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, had better living conditions and entitlements than his
victims back in Uganda who had not received any form of support to
heal or recover.202
Furthermore, the global climate surrounding these
international criminal courts, that ostensibly aim to deliver justice, is
overwrought, not only in claims of impotence, but also in doubts of
legitimacy. Take, for example, the United States’ refusal to allow ICC
200
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prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, into the country to investigate potential
war crimes violations by the U.S. in Afghanistan.203 As one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S.’ defiance to
comply with the ICC is behavior that engenders further disregard of
these allegedly “permanent” international institutions. If one of world’s
global powers is inclined to ignore strides at retributive justice, there
leaves little incentive for smaller, transitioning countries to act any
differently.
Institutions are at play that hinder the establishment of such
international prosecution, particularly if the Assad regime is to stay in
power and Russia is to continue shielding the regime. Both ad hoc
tribunals and the ICC would require approval from the Security
Council, which is currently unattainable with Russia’s occupancy of
one of the five permanent seats. Similarly, domestic courts
demonstrate an inability to deliver justice with their current
dependency on the Assad regime. Unless the judiciary was to undergo
an exhaustive purge and reformation, domestic courts would only
continue in the path of systematic injustice.
Even if Syria was able to find a path to international
prosecution, the cost and challenges of pursuing such a mechanism do
not appear to equal the value received by the victims. The complexity
of such lengthy trials implies notoriously high costs, especially when
the cost is evaluated against the number of people indicted by these
tribunals. From the ECCC costing 300 million dollars to the ICC
costing a billion dollars, international prosecution proves to be a
financial feat with a deep need for a steady stream of resources. Given
that President Trump has been cutting back on American funding of
the UN and other international institutions, it will be quite difficult for
any new tribunal to get the requisite financial support to be effective.204
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Additionally, international prosecution also faces challenges in
its pursuit of evidence, the bread and butter of all prosecutions. From
political obstacles to the mere logistics of sorting through the volumes
of evidence, trials struggle to find appropriate means of proving
allegations, especially without the guidance of a codified rule book to
screen admissible and non- admissible evidence. Furthermore, the
procurement of evidence proves especially challenging given the
serious nature of the crimes and the destruction caused by armed
conflict.
Thus, instead of allocating resources and hope to an institution
that has failed to deliver justice and successful deterrence, alternate
means of transitional justice should be explored. The same amount of
money that has been spent on tribunals could be diverted to
reconstruction efforts (political, economic, and military) and
reparations that focus on rebuilding from a grassroots level. This could
take the shape of new schools, memorializing the lives lost, rebuilding
fractured industries, investing in new and burgeoning local markets, or
even rebuilding broken roads and buildings. Resources could also be
redirected towards reconciliation initiatives that aim to rebuild and
transform relationships throughout social groups.
There are a number of alternatives for transitional justice other
than retributive justice. For the people of Syria, post armed conflict
mechanisms need to be explored in a manner that works to benefit
them, rather than alienate them. Justice should be investing in the
future of Syrians, instead of investing in showcases of inaccessible,
pseudo-justice.
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Table 2: Freedom Level in 2018
Freedom Level

ICTY
Bosnia & Herzegovina

Partly Free

Croatia

Free

Macedonia

Partly Free

Montenegro

Partly Free

Serbia

Free

Slovenia

Free

Rwanda

Not Free

Cambodia

Not Free

Sierra Leone

Partly Free

Lebanon

Partly Free

ICTR
ECCC
SCSL
STL

Table 3: Rule of Law in Former Yugoslavian States
Rule of Law
Bosnia & Herzegovina

7/16

Croatia

11/16

Macedonia

8/16

Montenegro

10/16

Serbia

9/16
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